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In August 1982, Mexico announced that it was unable to meet its debt 
obligations then falling due. Since this announcement more than 40 countries 
have been forced to reschedule on debt owed to commercial banks. Commercial 
banks have been criticized for blindly providing the lesser developed 
countries (LOCs) more credit and exposing themselves to more and more risk. 
For example, six months prior to Mexico's announcement that it could not meet 
its debt obligations, Mexico had been granted 6.4 billion dollars in new loans 
to make a total of 84 billion dollars in loans that needed to be rescheduled. 
If commercial banks had had more information on the credit risk of the LDCs, 
they could have foreseen such an event and taken some precautions, such as 
curtailing lending, to minimize their losses. Increased information on the 
riskiness of LOC debt could be extremely useful to commercial banks when 
making lending decisions or provisions. The purpose of this research is to 
estimate the risk associated with LOC debt, and to determine the variables 
which are significant in assessing this risk. 
The discussion begins in Section II with an introduction to the "debt 
crisis" and an explanation of the various developments causing this situation. 
Following this causal analysis is a discussion of some of the proposed 
solutions that have been developed and the success some of these proposed 
solutions have had. Section II ends with a brief review of previous 
econometric work done on debt-servicing capacity and some discussion of the 
shortcomings of these models. Section III includes a discussion of the model 
this paper uses to assess country risk or the probability of default, and 
Section IV presents the results of the model. Finally, Section V summarizes 
the results and suggests some of the model's potential uses. 
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Section II 
Over lending to underdeveloped countries began during the 1970's. Until 
the 1970's, banks' involvement with LOCs was limited to the provision of 
short-term trade finance facilities. After this period banks found LDC 
lending attractive for various reasons (which will be presented shortly), and 
started increasing their loans to developing countries at a rapid rate. By 
1983, U.S commercial banks owned over half of the 700 billion dollar debt 
owed by these developing countries. Luckily, banks have been able to carry 
their LOC loans at book value rather than market value. The average estimated 
secondary market price, as of July 1987, was between 45 and 55 dollars per 100 
dollars of debt, and had commercial banks been required to carry this debt at 
market value, six of the largest banks would have defaulted (Exhibit 1) (Sachs 
409). 
The world banking system is only one of the parties being adversely 
affected by the crisis. LOCs also face grave difficulties because external 
debt obligations conflict with developmental needs. The large magnitude of 
debt these countries face, and the service payments on these debts, drains LDC 
resources which could otherwise have been used for internal development. LDCs 
are now in the position of borrowing additional capital just to meet service 
obligations. 
Repayment problems have been attributed, in large part, to adverse 
developments in the international economy. OPEC's quadrupling of oil prices 
in 1973 was one such development. The oil importing developing countries 
found themselves unable to pay for these higher fuel prices from their own 
revenues. At the same time the current account balance of the oil exporting 
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countries jumped from seven billion dollars in 1973 to 68 billion dollars in 
1974. These surpluses found their way into banks worldwide and hence the 
banking community was awash with liquidity at a time when there was a large 
scale demand for credit on the part of the LOGs. This combined with the fact 
that banks could not lend to their traditional borrowers in industrial 
countries due to the global recession, triggered the lending boom (Makin 27). 
Another adverse development facing the LOGs during the 1970's was the 
surge of inflation in the industrial countries, particularly the United 
States. Inflation in industrial countries rose from a 1963-1972 average of 
4.2% to 11.7% in 1974. An important consequence of this greater than expected 
surge of inflation was a very low, often negative, real rate of interest. In 
order to protect themselves from this, bankers learned to tie rates on LDC 
loans to market rates or, failing that, to build a healthy premium into their 
lending rates. From 1977 to 1981 the USA's high domestic interest rates 
forced interest on Euroloans up from 7.8% to 17.5%. The World Bank estimates 
that increases in the interest rates such as LIBOR (London interbank offer 
rate) have a profound impact on the debt service requirements of LDGs. The 
latest figure estimates that for a 1% increase in LIBOR the debt of developing 
countries increases by 1.9 billion (Makin 22). These higher interest rates 
also had a large impact on exchange rates. Lured by higher interest rates in 
the United States, investors throughout the world switched their funds from 
other currencies to the US dollar. As a result the dollar exchange rate 
surged. This placed another burden on developing countries, as most of their 
debt was expressed in dollars. Developing countries found their debt servicing 
repayments an even worse drain on their resources than the higher oil prices, 
as more and more new loans were necessary to payoff existing debts. 
3 
LOC export markets declined as well during this period, caused in part by 
the global recession, and added to the problems. In 1981, the combined trade 
deficit for oil-importing developing nations was $99 billion. The average 
debt service ratio rose in two years from 17.4% in 1980 to 24.4% in 1982. 
Falling prices on raw materials, which are the chief exports of many 
developing countries, caused much of the problem. (Kette177). While they 
faced the rising cost of imports, developing countries saw a 25% drop in the 
price of raw materials in the period of 1980-1982 alone. Only countries whose 
exports were diversified and not solely raw materials were not hard hit by 
this slump. Increased protectionism in industrial countries also contributed 
to the decline in LOC's exports. Industrial countries, hit by a global 
recession, had to struggle with the problem of unemployment and therefore 
increasingly resorted to measures designed to defend their economies from 
world-market competition. This increased protectionism among industrial 
nations, along with falling raw material prices, created problems for LDCs in 
the adjustment of trade balances. 
Not all of the LOC problems are caused by external developments; 
inadequate internal economic and political structures are also to blame. 
While the industrial countries are increasingly resistant to price slumps or 
drops in demand in the world market, countries with less flexible development 
are plunged again and again into crisis. As Korner sees it, the economic and 
social development of the industrial countries was possible only because the 
decline of feudalism allowed capitalist structures to form in industry. 
Political power gradually shifted from great landowners to an industrial 
working class, which brought about higher wages and social reforms. 
Developing countries have not had agrarian reforms or revolutions which would 
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have modernized their political structure. Korner feels this is because 
political power remains in the hands of "parasitic oligarchies" and 
unproductive state classes. There is an unequal distribution of income to the 
very small upper and middle classes who have very low savings ratios. The 
high incomes of these classes are very lightly taxed as they control much of 
the power and can prevent attempts at tax reform or other reforms designed to 
bring about a fairer distribution of income. Rigid traditional social and 
political structures prevent economic development in general and the 
productive use of foreign capital in particular. Developing countries also 
have few educational and research institutions. Thus, they remain dependent 
on foreign technologically sophisticated goods, which they must import and pay 
for partly with foreign loans. Their financial personnel are also often 
poorly trained causing debt management for these countries to be even more 
difficult. 
Recently, there has also been discussion of capital flight and the 
adjustment burden this places on LOCs. Several studies have found that 
capital flight from LOCs in 1988 has totaled as much as 200 billion dollars 
(Lessard 27). Mexico was perhaps the hardest hit with capital flight totaling 
41.8 billion dollars from 1978 to 1982. Venezuela had similar problems, with 
capital flight 29.9 billion dollars during this same period. Overall the 
Latin American countries experienced more capital flight than other developing 
nations due to the very unstable currencies in these countries. Brazil, one 
of the largest Latin American debtors, is a unique exception to the phenomena 
of capital flight. The continuity of a competitive exchange rate policy, 
avoiding real appreciation, and maintaining tight exchange controls in Brazil, 
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was the central element that prevented any significant capital flight (Lessard 
44). 
Estimates of these magnitudes suggest that reduction in capital flight 
could substantially ease the debt burden on developing countries. One of the 
causes of capital flight in the developing countries has been an 
overvaluation of the exchange rate which has led to a fear of devaluation. 
This fear of devaluation causes the private sector to shift its funds abroad 
to avoid losses due to exchange rate fluctuation. The consequences of capital 
flight are an exportation of domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings 
which leads to shortages of funds for investment and development projects. 
This in turn severely hinders potential growth. Attempts to further develop 
and industrialize are impossible without significant capital. Capital flight 
financed through external borrowing further increases the debt burden of LDCs. 
All of these external developments and internal structural problems have 
created a situation in which many of the underdeveloped indebted nations are 
not able to meet the service payments on their outstanding debt. In this 
situation, a country may borrow more funds in order to meet its current 
payments. At times, however, this is impossible. It is then that debt needs 
to be rescheduled, forgiven, or repudiated. 
In recent years, help to struggling LDCs has come in the form of debt 
rescheduling in order to help them meet their current payments. These 
reschedu1ings are given under the stipulation that the developing countries 
follow a stabilization policy as directed by the IMF (Kette1 155). The 
object of these stabilization programs is to help stimulate the growth needed 
in the LDCs in order to help them meet their obligations. However, 
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stabilization programs have recently encountered strong criticism from debtor 
nations. The IMF deflation policies almost invariably lead to recession 
(Korner 137). Argentina is an example of how severely IMF policies reduce 
domestic economic activity. At the end of a five year stabilization period 
the country's gross domestic product was 2% lower than its original level, 
while in Portugal economic activity was halved. The IMF stabilization policy 
brought Chile a fall in per capita income of 12.7% and had similar effects in 
Peru and Turkey. It is argued that these programs systematically favor the 
industrial countries or creditor nations when developing programs (Korner 
131). While these policies are in theory a move in the right direction, the 
specifics of these programs need to be rethought to bring on more desirable 
effects. 
Advocates of reformed stabilization programs argue that they should 
include more socio-political and institutional reforms. Korner argues that 
selected economic targets will only be met if production-inhibiting land­
owning structures are reformed, if the tax system is restructured, and a more 
just distribution of income is achieved. Reforms are needed to stop 
mismanagement, corruption and personal privilege to make state enterprises and 
public administration more efficient (Korner 177). In the past, the World 
Bank's structural adjustment programs have shown that it is possible to 
include such reforms in condition packages. The task is therefore to create a 
political environment which enhances economic growth. 
Other proposed solutions have included selling off the debt at a 
discount, for long-term bonds to the IMF, World Bank or creating some new 
international fund for such purposes. While this will help take the risks off 
banks, banks will still incur losses, for their loans to LDCs are not worth in 
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the secondary market the value banks are carrying on their books. This 
solution can also be viewed as short-term because it does not take into 
consideration the need for economic growth. 
Debt-to-equity swaps seem to better suited for the situation for they 
will encourage economic growth. A debt-to-equity swap involves the commercial 
banks and the debtor country forming joint partnerships in businesses within 
the debtor nation. This solution assumes the full cooperation of the debtor 
countries in liberalizing regulations towards direct foreign investment. New 
investment in the financial services sector in the LOCs is well suited for 
both banks and the LOCs. The country's consumers and businesses will gain by 
the increased competition in the financial service sector, while the bank 
gains new business opportunities in a field of its own expertise (Kettel 140). 
This new direct business relationship will help banks form a long-term 
strategic interest with the developing countries. Not only will banks' 
involvement with the local economy enhance their interest in the economic 
growth of the country, but the country will gain by having access to new and 
varied forms of financial services. 
Yet another proposed solution to the debt problem involves trade surplus 
nations helping developing countries' trade-deficit problems. The 
Compensatory Financing Facility, which was introduced in 1963 to finance 
temporary reductions in export earnings, has been suggested as the agency to 
be used in such a solution. IMF member states with surpluses would pay a 
substantial part of their surpluses to fund the facility. The fund could then 
be used by the LOCs facing trade-deficit problems (Korner 177). This solution 
must accompany a plan which would help LOCs boost exports permanently. 
The Brady plan has been the first attempt to use these trade surpluses to 
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help the LOGs with Japan agreeing to supply 4.5 billion dollars under the plan 
to bolster IMF and World Bank assistance. The Brady Plan is also gaining 
recognition for being the first plan to offer debt forgiveness. To reduce the 
$350 billion mountain of Latin debt, Brady asked banks to forgive some loans 
in exchange for binding guarantees that the rest of the money will be repaid. 
Brady's plan urges banks to work out deals on a case-by-case basis, but 
provides bankers with sketched out guidelines. Brady's proposal applies to 
all of the LOGs but targets Latin America. Mexico will be the first country 
to negotiate a deal under the plan with, Venezuela, the Philippines and Costa 
Rica next. There has been some skepticism of the Brady plan by those who feel 
the LOGs are beginning to wait in line for assistance from the US commercial 
banks. These skeptics feel that debt assistance and forgiveness will be 
limited and policies which have more specific details of who gets what are 
needed. The Brady plan is still considered a step in the right direction for 
it includes debt-forgiveness, which is something that no other plan has 
included. 
Previous to the Brady plan, in 1985, was the Baker plan, in which, then 
Secretary of State James Baker, called for the IMF and World Bank to join with 
the commercial banks to provide an additional 29 billion dollars in new loans 
to struggling LOGs. The countries receiving additional loans were to 
undertake comprehensive adjustment programs to reduce inflation and promote 
growth. Secretary Baker believed new lending would generate the growth needed 
to reduce the burden of debt-service payments and asked the commercial banks 
to adopt specific targets for new lending. The targets for new lending, 
however, were not met by commercial banks, and in some cases, bank claims on 
debtor nations were actually reduced. Then, in 1987, some of the major 
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commercial banks, led by Citicorp, set aside larger loan loss reserves against 
their exposure to the debtor countries. This was a signal from the banks that 
they did not intend to support the Baker Plan. Debt forgiveness was not 
mentioned in this plan which was criticized for subjecting commercial banks to 
more unwanted risk. 
Perhaps additional loans to some LOCs do not add more unwanted risk to 
the banks' loan portfolios, but rather increase the long run probability of 
loan repayment. It is these countries that warrant increased bank 
involvement. Commercial banks are in need of more information concerning the 
LOCs' debt-servicing position in order to make these lending decisions. 
Two previous econometric studies on debt-servicing capacity have provided 
a framework for the model presented here. The first study, by Frank and 
Cline, was an application of discriminant analysis for measurement of debt 
servicing capacity. The study attempted to identify the variables which are 
important in classifying a country as a default country (risky) or non,default 
country (non-risky). Frank and Cline included the following variables: a debt 
service ratio (the ratio of debt-service to exports); the growth rate of 
exports; an export fluctuation index; a ratio of "non-compressible" 
imports(imports which cannot be eliminated) as a fraction of total imports; 
per capita income; the average maturity of loans; cash and foreign exchange 
reserves; and a ratio of imports to gross national product. Out of these 
variables Frank and Cline found only three variables significant at the 5% 
level: the debt-service ratio, average maturity of loans and the import 
reserve ratio. This study included data for 26 countries over a nine year 
period for a total of 234 observations but because of missing data the number 
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of observations was reduced to 145. The number of Type I errors was 3 and the 
number of Type II errors was 15. Type I errors occur when the model 
classifies a country as non-default when it is actually a default, while Type 
II errors occur when the model predicts that a non-default country will be 
part of the default population. Overall Frank and Cline had a 12.4% 
prediction error. 
Although this model had a relatively small margin of error, there are 
criticisms of the theoretical framework of the model. Feder and Just, in 
their study of debt-servicing capacity, argue that discriminant analysis is 
not an appropriate method to measure debt-servicing capacity and suggest that 
a logit model is better suited. They argue that, while discriminant analysis 
assumes two completely different populations, the logit approach assumes a 
discrete event takes place after the combined effect of certain economic 
variables reaches some threshold. That is, it makes more sense to claim that 
in a specific period the country was pushed beyond a critical level leading to 
a rescheduling, than to claim that the country suddenly becomes a member of 
another class. 
Feder and Just use nine economic indicators in their work but, to 
facilitate a brief discussion of them, seven are defined the same as in the 
Frank and Cline study. The two additional indicators used are capital inflows 
and growth of per capita domestic product. Non-compressible imports used in 
the Frank and Cline study was omitted on theoretical grounds. The usual 
argument is that consumption of some imports which are not vital necessities 
(compressible imports) can be curtailed temporarily to increase foreign 
exchange for debt-servicing purposes. Therefore a high percentage of 
compressible imports will lead to a lower probability of debt-servicing 
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difficulty. Feder and Just argue that the possibilities for reducing imports 
may depend on a governments internal political status rather than on the 
economic importance of import items. Thus the measure of compressible imports 
will not be adequate until an approach to including political status is 
developed. Feder and Just found five variables to be important in measuring 
debt-servicing capacity which include: the import reserve ratio; the debt 
service ratio; the amortization ratio; export growth; and per capita income. 
The Feder and Just model had a total of 238 data observations and had a lower 
margin of error than the previous Frank and Cline study with only one Type I 
error and seven Type II errors. 
Although both of these models have a relatively low margin of error with 
most of the variables significant, the model presented in this paper will 
attempt to improve upon these previous models by including additional 
important variables which are left out of the two previous studies. Neither 
of the studies include a variable which would take into account the 
structural make-up of an economy. The model presented here will include the 
variable % of agricultural exports to total exports to account for the 
structure of a country's economy. By including this, the affect of a more 
industrialized economy on the riskiness of a country's outstanding debt can be 
estimated. This model will also include a variable which will account for 
Mexico's announcement of default in 1982 and the following "bandwagon" effect 
that resulted. After Mexico's announcement of default, forty additional 
countries announced the need for rescheduling. This suggests that perhaps 
some countries were more inclined to seek rescheduling after Mexico's success 
in rescheduling in 1982. 
12 
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Section III: Model 
In order to estimate the risk associated with a country's debt, several 
variables and their estimated effects on the risk will be examined in this 
study. The most commonly used indicator in assessing risk is the debt-service 
ratio. The debt-service ratio is the ratio of debt-service payments to 
exports. It is important in that any shortfall of foreign exchange earnings 
in the current account balance must be financed with either additional 
borrowing (capital import), or exchange reserves. Assuming that additional 
borrowing is not a favorable choice and exchange reserves are rather limited, 
the shortage in foreign exchange earnings must be met by a reduction in 
imports. Significant import reduction, in many countries ,is difficult due to 
the fact that much of the imports in LOCs are used for development and 
investment projects. Therefore the higher the debt-service ratio the higher 
the probability of default. 
A second variable related to the debt-service ratio is the growth ,of 
exports. Growing export markets will increase foreign exchange earnings and 
increase the probability that a country will be able to meet its current 
service obligations by using these increased foreign exchange earnings. For 
countries with large trade-deficits increasing exports will help close these 
trade gaps and reduce the amount of import reduction necessary to meet a 
shortfall in exchange earnings. Therefore the higher the growth in exports 
the lower the probability of default. 
A country's official reserves are also important in estimating the 
probability of default because they measure a country's ability to pay without 
borrowing. Reserves include foreign exchange holdings and the net position of 
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the country with the IMF. The ratio of imports to reserves will be used here 
to allow for comparable measures among countries. The larger the ratio of 
imports to reserves the lower the debt-servicing capacity. This is because a 
shortfall in exchange earnings can be financed through reserves rather than 
additional borrowing, or import reduction when there are adequate reserves. 
The London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR), as mentioned earlier, has been 
shown to have severe effects on debt-service payments. Whereas the debt 
service ratio measures the ratio of debt-service payments to exports and the 
import reduction needed to meet these service payments in the absence of 
adequate foreign exchange earnings, changes in the LIBOR are used in this 
model to account for the effects these changes have on the actual debt-service 
payments. These increases in recent years have been shown to be a tremendous 
drain on LOG resources. Large positive changes in the LIBOR will have an 
expected negative impact on debt-servicing capacity. 
The percentage of agricultural exports is used to estimate the effects 
the structural make-up of an economy has on the riskiness of LOG debt. As 
mentioned earlier, declining export markets for agricultural products 
devastated the LOG's trade earnings during the world recession in the early 
1980's. Prices of raw materials have also been declining, worsening their 
trade balances. Thus the higher the percentage of agricultural exports the 
more sensitive a country is to external world market developments. The ratio 
also will be used as a structural proxy for internal development. As 
countries develop, their industrial base develops as well, allowing for a more 
equal distribution of income and a shift in political power to an industrial 
class who brings with it higher wages and social reforms. The more 
industrialized a country becomes the more resistant it is to price slumps and 
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declining export markets. Therefore countries with higher percentages of 
agricultural goods to total exports will have a higher probability of default. 
Year to year changes in the level of investment are used here to account 
for the degree of capital flight, and to account for the effect of investment 
on the development of the LOC's economy. Negative changes in investment from 
year to year will mean stagnant development, and indicate probable capital 
flight; hence a higher probability of default. 
Per capita income will be included in this model because it seems likely 
that the higher the per capita income, the lower the probability of default. 
This is because the higher the level of per capita income the higher the level 
of savings and therefore the higher the level of investment. High levels of 
per capita income mean higher government revenues which may be used for 
development projects as well. 
Finally this model will include a dummy variable taking on the value of 
zero until 1982 and from then on taking the value of one. This dummy variable 
is included to account for Mexico's announcement, in 1982, that it would no 
longer honor its service payments, and the bandwagon effects this announcement 
may have brought with it. 
All of the preceding variables can be grouped to form the following 
equation: 
Zt- b1(DSR) + b2 (EXP) + b3 (Res) +b4 (LIBOR) +b6 (%AGR) + 
b7 (INV) + bs(PERCAP) + bg(DUMMY) 
where DSR- Debt service ratio 
EXP- growth in exports 
Res- official reserves 
LIBOR- London Interbank Offer Rate 
15 
%AGR- percentage of agricultural exports 
INV- change in investment 
PERCAP- per capita income 
DUMMY- dummy variable 
In this equation Zt is the variable indicating the presence of a default 
in year t. It has a value of one for a default and zero otherwise. The term, 
"default," as mentioned earlier, is used when debt is forgiven, rescheduled or 
repudiated. The effect each of the above variables has on the default 
probability of a country can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. 
The logit method can be used once the preceding equation is statistically 
estimated with the resulting dependent variable z being transformed into an 
indicator of the probability of default as shown below: 
P- l/(l+e-Z ) 
where P is the composite indicator of the probability of default, and e is the 
base of the natural logarithm. This probability indicator may vary from zero 
(as z approaches negative infinity) to one (as z approaches positive 
infinity). 
Both cross sectional and time series data are used. The countries 
included in the data sample are listed in exhibit 2 along with the years of 
default observations included. The time series is for the years 1972-1985. 
Data sources include the World Banks' World Tables, In~ernational Financial 
Statistics. the Wall Street Journal Index, and United States Business 
Statistics. 
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Section IV: Results 
The table below contains the initial results obtained from the preceding 
logit model. Four out the eight variables have the predicted effects at .05 
level of significance. These include: percentage of agricultural exports, 
reserves, investment, and the debt-service ratio. 
LOGIT MODEL FOR DEP 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-STATISTIC 
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 
1 Constant -4.826119 ( 1.1930) -4.0452 
2 PERCAP 0.003572 ( 0.0007) 5.2328 
3 %AGR 0.050434 ( 0.0149) 3.3815 
4 ADJRES -0.000514 ( 0.0002) -2.8933 
5 LIBOR -0.055577 ( 0.0624) -0.8907 
6 INV -0.006515 ( 0.0014) -4.5555 
7 DSR 2.663414 ( 1.7051) 1. 5621 
8 DUMMY -0.139377 ( 0.4783) -0.2914 
9 FDEXP -0.000109 ( 0.0001) -0.8271 
Per capita income, although significant, has the wrong predicted sign 
which suggests that the conventional belief that lower-income countries are 
less credit worthy may be incorrect. The other four statistically significant 
variables all carried the predicted sign. 
Curiously, the LIBOR is not only statistically insignificant, but also 
carries a negative sign. This suggests that the higher the interest rate on 
loans the lower the probability of default. This not only violates financial 
theory, but refutes the claim that rising interest rates caused much of the 
debt-servicing difficulty in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The data in 
the sample reveal that, in fact, countries continued to experience debt-
servicing difficulty even after the decline in interest rates began. Perhaps 
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the interest rate on LOC loans does not closely follow world interest rates, 
but rather, reflects the risk associated with LOC debt. 
The dummy variable in the model which incorporates Mexico's default 
announcement in 1982 and the "band wagon effects" this announcement brought 
with it is also statistically insignificant. This could be due to the 
relatively small data sample used for this model. After Mexico's 
announcement in 1982, 40 additional countries sought additional loans and 
rescheduled debt payments. The data sample, however, includes only a small 
proportion of these countries, which could be the cause of this variable's 
insignificance. 
Also showing statistically insignificant was the variable growth of 
exports. In later variations of the model, however, when lagged growth of 
exports is used, it becomes significant and carries the predicted sign. 
The estimated coefficients in the results table have a different 
interpretation than they would in an ordinary least squares regression, where 
the coefficients tell the unit change in the dependent variable from a unit 
change in the given independent variable. In the logit model, the 
coefficients tell the change in the log of the odds of default given, a unit 
change in the independent variable. For example, the estimated coefficient 
for per capita income is .003207. This means that for a dollar increase in 
per capita income the log of the odds, change by .003207. 
The table below gives the slight variant of the original model which 
obtained the best results. This model includes the variables per capita 
income, percentage of agricultural exports, reserves, change in per capita 
income, investment, the debt-service ratio, the dummy variable specified 
earlier, a one year lagged dependent variable, and a one year lagged change in 
18
 
•
 
exports variable. All variables in this variation are significant at a .05 
level except the debt-service ratio which is significant at an .075 level. 
LOGIT MODEL FOR DEP 
VARIABLE ESTIMATED STANDARD T-STATISTIC 
NAME COEFFICIENT ERROR 
1 Constant -5.467878 ( 1.1334) -4.8243 
2 PERCAP 0.003207 ( 0.0007) 4.7196 
3 %AGR 0.052034 ( 0.0154) 3.3862 
4 ADJRES -0.000501 ( 0.0002) -2.9040 
5 FDPERCAP -0.004205 ( 0.0015) -2.8170 
6 INV -0.004943 ( 0.0014) -3.4419 
7 DSR 2.686617 ( 1. 8370) 1.4625 
8 DUMMY -1.000070 ( 0.5923) -1. 6885 
9 LAGDEP 0.936655 ( 0.4592) 2.0397 
10 LAGFDEXP -0.005915 ( 0.0028) -2.1091 
The dummy variable is significant but has the wrong predicted sign. 
Again, this could be due to the small data sample which only contained a small 
number of the total defaults during this period. 
Per capita income is again significant with the wrong predicted sign, 
however, the change in per capita income is significant with the expected 
sign. This, again, suggests that it is not only the lower income countries 
that are experiencing debt-servicing difficulty, but the higher income 
countries that are experiencing a decline in income as well. 
The lagged dependent variable included in this variant is significant 
with the predicted sign. It has a positive sign, which indicates that if a 
country defaults in a given year, the probability of default for the 
following year is also higher. 
Although significant variables are important in judging the models 
performance, the best indicator of the model's performance is its success in 
predicting the occurrence and absence of rescheduling. Unfortunately, the 
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overall predictive power of a logit model is more difficult to determine than 
in the case of a normal ordinary least squares regression analysis, in which 
the "adjusted R squared" represents the total variation in the dependent 
variable explained by the model. In measuring the predictive power of a logit 
model, it is first necessary to transform the estimated "z", the log odds of 
default, into a probability. It is then necessary to choose a threshold 
probability, above which the model has predicted default, and below which it 
has not. The first step merely entails transforming the model's estimates of 
"z" for each data observation into probabilities. Once these probabilities 
are obtained, a threshold value must then be determined. One possible 
approach is simply to choose .5 as the critical threshold. If the models 
estimated probability exceeds .5 it has predicted default, while if it lower 
than .5 it has predicted non-default. This approach, however, would lead to 
an extremely unbalanced distribution of errors with only a small percentage 
of non-default cases wrongly predicted (Type I error), but practically all of 
the default cases wrongly predicated as non-default (Type II error.) , 
The approach taken here resembles the established tradition of choosing a 
critical probability threshold which results in a relatively equal percentage 
rate of error for the two types of errors. That is, the threshold is chosen 
so that not all of the error is concentrated in one direction or other. 
While this is a common method of measuring a logit model's predictive power, 
its fault lies in that the model's estimates are used in determining its own 
predictive power. The coefficients estimated are not the true coefficients 
and may contain errors which will affect the models predicted probabilities. 
This in turn may result in the threshold probability being biased. Due to the 
characteristics of the data sample used for this model, however, this method 
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seems appropriate. The large imbalance of default observations (36) as 
compared to non-default observations (433) warrants this approach. 
The critical threshold that best minimizes the distribution of error in 
this particular model is 0.17. Any predicted probability higher than .17 is a 
predicted default while anything lower is a non-default prediction. Using 
this threshold for prediction the regression in Exhibit 4 correctly explained 
approximately 88% of non-default cases, and 82% of default cases. Overall all 
the model predicted 87% of all observations correctly which is comparable to 
the error rates of the previously discussed models. 
A closer analysis of the model's wrongly predicted cases reveals that a 
good deal of the models' errors were concentrated in three countries. The 
model's errors for Bolivia, Peru, and Zambia, account for 40% of the model's 
total errors. In the case of Peru the model does show a trend that would 
indicated debt-servicing difficulty, however, the models' estimated 
probabilities did not reach the critical threshold value of .2 in the actual 
event of default. The model had similar problems with Bolivia. It did, as 
with the case of Peru, show a definite trend towards debt-servicing 
difficulty, however, the models predicated probabilities did not reach the 
critical threshold until one year following the actual event of default. 
Although the model wrongly predicted the occurrence of a default in a number 
of cases for these countries, it was correct in showing the trend toward debt­
servicing difficulty. 
With the case of Zambia the model did not perform as well. It predicted 
default for the years 1975-1985, but in actuality, Zambia had no instances of 
default or debt-servicing difficulty in the years included in the data sample. 
The model was completely inaccurate in predicating cases of default. Perhaps 
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there is a" lack of data concerning Zambia's reschedulings, or perhaps Zambia 
has support from another country in meeting its debt obligations. Notice in 
Exhibit 1 that Zambia's debt is only worth 18 cents on the dollar which 
indicates that it is perceived as a credit risk, even though it has never 
needed debt rescheduling. Further research should look at Zambia's political 
and economic position in order to better explain the model's completely 
inaccurate predictions for this country. If the faulty predictions for these 
preceding countries are excluded, the error rate for the model becomes 8%. 
Section V: Conclusion 
In sum, the results obtained in this study, support most of the 
hypotheses presented. The key influences on the probability of LDC default 
are, changes in per capita income, percentage of agricultural exports, reserve 
levels, investment levels, the debt-service ratio, previous events of default, 
and the previous years change in exports. Obviously, these are not th~ only 
influences affecting the LDCs' ability to meet debt obligations, however, 
these influences found significant could provide guidelines for policy makers 
attempting to enact economic programs that will enhance the probabilities of 
LDC loan repayment. Political structures and other country specific 
variables are not included in this model which limits the models use in such 
an area, but nonetheless, the model does suggest general guidelines. It is 
naive to think that all LDCs can be classified as experiencing the same 
difficulties, and further research should try and incorporate more country 
specific variables in estimating a countries probability of loan repayment. 
The accuracy level of the model does confirm the belief that objective 
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risk assessment for LOG loans is possible and can provide bankers with 
relatively accurate estimates of the probability that a given country will be 
able to meet its debt obligations in a given year. The nature of the model 
prohibits long-term probability estimations, except in cases where accurate 
levels of the significant independent variables can be determined for the 
future. In recent years, short-term loans to countries unable to meet the 
service obligations on long-term debt have been very common, and it is in this 
case a risk assessment model such as this one would be beneficial. The model 
can also be useful in helping commercial banks predict and prepare for 
potential disruptions in the expected performance of their LOG loan 
portfolios. Necessary loan loss reserves and similar precautionary measures, 
along with secondary market values of LOG debt, could be more accurately 
determined using the information this model provides. 
This research was in no wayan attempt to discourage further bank 
involvement in the LOG crisis, but was merely an attempt to provide banks with 
more information concerning their LOG loans. Halting lending to the LOGs is 
not a solution to the problem, but more adequate information can help banks in 
making lending decisions and provisions. 
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Millions of dollars except where noted 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Secondary Market 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Debt to Bid 
financial price Total 
Country institutions dollars value 
Argentina 2()395.3 47 9585.8 
Bolivia 126.3 10 12.6 
Brazil 49624.7 55 27293.6 
Chile 12084.8 67 8096.8 
Colombia 4144.2 81 3356.8 
Costa Rica 1530.4 33 505 
Dominican RepLlbl i c 328.4 42 137.9 
Ecuador 4972.5 45 2237.6 
Gabon 532 82 436.2 
Guatemala 101. 1 72 72.8 
Honduras 164.8 38 62.6 
Ivory Coast 2486.6 60 1492 
Jamaica 406.5 37 150.4· 
Liberia 41.4 5 2. 1 
Malawi 53.7 74 39.7 
Me:·: ico 58757.3 53 31141.4 
Morocco 2568 65.5 1682 
Nicaragua 1144.9 5 57.2 
Nigeria 6515.2 28 1824.3 
Panama 1877.6 64 1201.7 
Peru 3224.6 11 354.7 
Philippines 4206.6 67 2818.4 
Romania 2261.4 87 1967.4 
Senegal 233.5 61 142.4 
..,Sudan 553.6 "'- 11. 1 
Uruguay 1300.5 68 884.3 
Venezuela 9968.2 67 6678.7 
Yugoslavia 4510.3 70 3157.2 
Zaire 402.9 24.5 98.7 
Zambia 226.5 18 40.8 
Total 194743.8 105542.3 
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Exhibit 2.
 
Countries Included in Logit Analysis
 
Along with Years of Default Observations
 
1. Algeria 
2. Argentina 1976,82,83,84 
3. Bolivia 1981,83 
4. Brazil 1982,83 
5. Chile 1972,74,75,83,84 
6. Colombia 
7. Ecuador 1982,84 
8. Egypt 
9. Greece 
10. Indonesia 
11. India 
12. Israel 
13. Korea 
14. Malaysia 
15. Mexico 1982,84,85 
•
 
16. Morocco 1983 
17. Nigeria 1983 
18. Pakistan 
19. Peru 1976,78,79,83,84 
20. Philippines 1983 
21. Portugal 
22. Sudan 1979,81,82 
23. Syria 
24. Thailand 
25. Tunisia 
26. Turkey 1978,79,80,82 
27. Venezuela 1982,83,84 
28. Yugoslavia 1983,84 
29. Zaire 1976,77,79,80,81,83,84 
30. Zambia 
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Exhibit 3. 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficient Anti-Log* 
Per Cap 0.003207 1.007 
%Agr 0.052034 1.127 
Res - 0.000501 0.999 
FDPerCap - 0.004205 1.009 
INV - 0.004943 0.988 
Dwnmy - 1.000070 0.099 
LagDep 0.936655 8.642 
LagExp - 0.005915 0.986 
*	 The anti-log of the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as the change 
in the odds of default for a unit change of the corresponding variable. 
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